



**Director of  
Central  
Intelligence**

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# **National Intelligence Daily**

***Thursday  
10 June 1982***

State Dept. review completed

DIA review  
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
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
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
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


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## ④ MAURITIUS: Moderate Government Facing Defeat

5 Prime Minister Ramgoolam's moderate, pro-Western government is likely to be defeated by the Soviet- and Libyan-supported Mauritian Militant Movement in parliamentary elections tomorrow. [ ]

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1/2 Ramgoolam's Labor Party has lost support principally because of the country's economic decline. Polls point to an easy victory by the Movement and its more moderate Socialist Party allies. [ ]

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2 Comment: If the vote is close, Ramgoolam probably will try to form a government by encouraging defections from the Socialists. Constitutional prerogatives allow the incumbent to have the first opportunity to form a government. [ ]

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5 A government headed by the Movement would allow some increase in Soviet and Libyan influence in Mauritius and in the southwest Indian Ocean region. The Western powers almost certainly would lose naval and other military access to Mauritius. Leaders of the Movement claim that the Soviets also would be denied such access--as they are by leftist Madagascar--but Moscow probably would gain influence by providing military aid and training. [ ]

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5 A regime controlled by the Movement would criticize the US military presence on Diego Garcia and reassert Mauritian claims to the island. It also would join the governments of Seychelles and Madagascar in advocating the Indian Ocean "zone of peace" concept, which is also supported by Moscow. [ ]

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1/3/5 Although Movement leader Berenger has espoused radical causes, moderates in his own group and in the Socialist Party would oppose restrictions on civil liberties and a large increase in Soviet or Libyan influence. Berenger probably would nationalize only selected enterprises in the short term to avoid jeopardizing Mauritius's economic ties with the West. [ ]

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4/5 If Ramgoolam survives, he would continue to need substantial Western economic aid to stave off challenges by the opposition. No matter which side wins, however, there could be violence against the US Embassy by radicals in the Movement in the wake of charges of US election support for Labor. [ ]

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NORTH YEMEN - SOUTH YEMEN: Prospects for Clash Diminish

*The possibility of a major clash between North Yemeni and South Yemeni regular forces appears to be receding, in part because hardline elements in South Yemen are being held in check.*

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Sanaa has slowed its drive against beleaguered insurgents belonging to the Aden-backed National Democratic Front. This is strengthening the hand of South Yemeni President al-Hasani, who opposes the aggressive policies pushed by hardliners in the South Yemeni military and in the Front's leadership.

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The Soviets reportedly also are counseling restraint in Aden. According to Aden radio, General Petrov, Commander of Soviet Ground Forces, met South Yemeni Defense Minister Qasim, the leading insurgent supporter and proponent of intervention, during a brief stopover in Aden last week.

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Qasim is trying to consolidate his power base in the military in preparation for a possible move against al-Hasani. The President and Qasim have been maneuvering for months to oust each other.

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Comment: Al-Hasani probably will be able to keep the hardliners in check as long as he retains Moscow's support for his policy of restraint. The Soviets presumably calculate that expanded hostilities could jeopardize the gains that they have made in Sanaa in recent years, and General Petrov may have tried to soften Qasim's position.

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IRAQ-IRAN: Iraqi Peace Offer

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
The Iraqi Government's offer yesterday of an unconditional cease-fire and a unilateral withdrawal was combined with an appeal for a common Islamic front against Israel. The announcement by the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council omitted any reference to President Saddam Hussein and has led to speculation that he has been removed from office. Saddam also was not mentioned in Iraqi press announcements of the peace offer.

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Comment: Tehran probably recognizes that Baghdad's offer is an attempt to capitalize on the Israeli invasion of Lebanon to find a way out of the war. Iran, nonetheless, may be interested in it--especially if reparations are offered--as a way of avoiding the decision of whether to invade Iraq.

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